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contributions more than punishment, and, taking into account the cost of 
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communication are essential to this result:  exchanges of numerical messages, 
exchanges of verbal messages through a computer chat room, and face-to-face 
communication.  Compared with a baseline of no communication and no 
punishment, we find that chat room communication increases cooperation and 
efficiency nearly as much as face-to-face communication, even though the chat 
room environment does not communicate cues of facial expression, tone of voice, 
and body language.  Verbal communication is so effective that adding a punishment 
option to it does not significantly change the level of contributions or earnings.  In 
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Communication and Punishment in Voluntary Contribution Experiments 
by Olivier Bochet, Talbot Page and Louis Putterman, Brown University 
 
1. Introduction 
In teams, firms and other groups, individuals are encouraged to undertake activities 
for the common good – law partners to do their share of rainmaking, professors their 
share of grant writing and advancing the name of the department, electric utilities to 
reduce their emissions of sulfur dioxide and mercury, and listeners of public radio to 
financially support it.  Sometimes the encouragement is through communication and 
sometimes by more direct incentives like threatened reduction in earnings (fines and 
punishment).  But when there are opportunities to free ride (or shirk), both economic 
theory and empirical observation suggest that free riding can erode cooperation far below 
its efficient levels. 
Over the past 15 years experimental study of voluntary contribution mechanisms, 
which are versions of prisoners’ dilemmas, has increased our understanding of the 
problem of cooperation, on both theoretical and practical levels.  The analysis has 
focused on two solution concepts, (iterated) dominance and Bayesian equilibria.  As a 
test of the first concept, finitely repeated voluntary contribution mechanisms (VCMs) are 
designed to unravel from the end, with experimental subjects having iterated dominant 
strategies to free ride and contribute nothing.  When subjects are given the opportunity to 
punish low contributing partners, exercise of this opportunity is made costly by design, so 
that iterated dominance predicts there will be no punishment either.  When 
communication is allowed, by design there are no binding agreements so that 
communication reduces to “cheap talk” and is non-credible, according to standard game 
theory. 
The experimental results have not confirmed the predictions of iterated dominance 
for payoff maximizers.  Instead, experimentalists have found that communication 
increases cooperation, and punishment either increases it or prevents it from declining to 
the low levels of baseline treatments without communication or punishment. 
These results appear consistent with Bayesian games, with common knowledge 
priors of heterogeneous types (see Kreps et al., 1982).  In a Bayesian game where there   3 
are two types of preferences, one type where the utility is the monetary payoff and the 
other type where utility increases not only with increasing monetary payoff but also with 
increasing cooperation and reciprocity, it may take only a small prior probability of the 
second type to make it worthwhile for players of both types to invest in a reputation of 
reciprocity in the early periods of the game.
1  In a realization of the Bayesian equilibrium 
of such a reputation game, there need not be any of the cooperative type players drawn 
for there to be incentives for payoff maximizing types of players to build reputations for 
reciprocity in the early periods. 
Even though VCMs with 10 or more periods, 4 or more players, 2 or more player 
types, and complicated information structures have so far proved too difficult to solve for 
Bayesian equilibria, those studying behavior in such experiments have devoted increasing 
attention to signaling, reputation, and heterogeneous preferences associated with 
Bayesian games.  Much of the recent work on VCMs has been to identify empirical 
regularities of signaling, reputation, cooperation and reciprocity dependent on variations 
in the VCM game form. 
The main contribution of this paper is to find additional evidence supporting a 
Bayesian interpretation of cooperation.  More specifically, in investigating three forms of 
communication, we found that communicating verbal messages through a computer chat 
room – which screens out identity, facial expression, tone of voice, and body language – 
increased cooperation and efficiency nearly as much as face-to-face communication, 
compared with a baseline of no communication and no punishment.  In contrast, we 
found that “numerical cheap talk” – nonbinding announcements of possible contribution 
levels that individuals could make and immediately revise in response to others’ 
messages – had almost no net effect on total contributions or aggregate efficiency. 
In comparing each of the three forms of communication with a treatment with 
punishment but no communication, we found that face-to-face communication and chat 
room communication increased cooperation and efficiency more than did punishment by 
itself. 
In designing the experiment, we conjectured that opportunities to communicate and 
to punish might interact in ways such that each would enhance the effectiveness of the 
                                                 
1 See also McKelvey and Palfrey (1992).   4 
other.  Communication might improve the efficiency of punishment by allowing subjects 
to convey threats to punish low contributors at lower cost – i.e., without actually having 
to carry out the threats as often.  If would-be punishers could credibly convey their 
intention to punish low contributions, high contributions might be elicited from the latter 
with less punishment and lower monetary costs of punishing and being punished. 
We also conjectured that the opportunity to punish might add to the credibility of 
communication.  By first threatening to punish low contributors and then carrying 
through by punishing low contributors in the early periods, the signal conveyed in the 
communication might be taken more seriously in the later periods.  Moreover, verbal 
agreements for mutually high contributions made in face-to-face or chat room 
communication might be self-enforcing if subjects who made the agreement and stuck 
with it later saw others begin to free ride and, feeling betrayed, promptly exacted 
punishment. 
However, we found that verbal communication by itself increased cooperation so 
much that the combined treatment of communication and punishment had only slightly 
higher levels of contribution than either chat room or face-to-face communication alone, 
and this difference was not statistically significant.  Each of the three forms of 
communication without punishment had higher earnings (and hence efficiency) than 
when combined with punishment, but these differences were small and insignificant. 
Moreover, while the opportunity to punish (without communication) clearly 
increased cooperation over baseline in agreement with the earlier literature, we found that 
the opportunity to punish did not increase efficiency in our experiment.  Efficiency of 
punishment is limited in two ways.  First, in our and other experiments including 
punishment, punishment is made costly to the punisher by design to reflect the costs of 
punishment in the real world.  Second, to avoid leading subjects to act in a pre-
determined fashion, earnings reductions can be targeted at high and low contributors 
alike.  As things turn out, most reductions are targeted at low contributors, but that 
doesn’t prevent some high contributors from having their earnings reduced also. We 
found that about 20% of punishment dollars was targeted on subjects who contributed 
more than the average, and sometimes on those who contributed the maximum amount,   5 
in their group.  Punishing the high contributors, what we call “perverse punishment,” 
decreases their incentives to cooperate, as we found in a regression analysis.   
Indeed, an additional reason, not mentioned above, why combining 
communication with punishment might raise efficiency is that perverse punishment might 
be reduced by communication if it helps subjects come to a shared understanding of the 
nature of the problem facing them.
2  This did not appear to be the case in our 
experiments, however. 
In sum, we found that chat room communication was almost as effective in 
increasing contributions and efficiency as face-to-face communication; numerical cheap 
talk had almost no net effect on contributions and efficiency; and verbal communication 
by itself increased contributions and efficiency about the same amount as did the 
combination of verbal communication and punishment. 
These findings are related to the literature as follows.  In an earlier study, Ostrom 
et al. (1992), found cooperators were sometimes punished in what the researchers called 
“blind revenge.”
3  Saijo and Nakajima (1995), also found evidence of punishing high 
contributors in a broader pattern they called “spite” (some subjects punish both high and 
low contributors to raise their own relative payoffs).  Because the opportunity to reduce 
others’ earnings is not always used in the experiment as a punishment for their actions, 
we adopt the more neutral term reduction in much of what follows, though we use the 
more familiar punishment interchangably with it in parts of our discussion. 
The combined treatment of reduction and communication opportunities adds two 
degrees of freedom to the standard VCM with neither opportunity.  Ostrom, Gardner and 
Walker (1992) found adding “a sword” to “a covenant,” (adding a sanctioning option to 
pre-play face-to-face communication) the most effective way of approaching full 
efficiency in their common pool resource experiments, of the treatments they studied.  
Their experiment differs from ours and others in the VCM literature in having an interior 
optimum and no pre-announced ending period (it has a randomly selected last period). 
                                                 
2 Brosig et al. (forthcoming) note that verbal communication allows more astute subjects to help others in 
their groups to understand the structure of the public goods game.  A clearer recognition that encouraging 
others to contribute is in their own interest might deter some perverse punishers. 
3 “Blind revenge” refers to your attempt to get back at a person whom you suspect of having punished you.  
Such attempts are “blind” in the experiments of Ostrom et al., Fehr and Gächter (2000a) and the present 
paper, because subjects learn the total punishment assigned to them but not who has assigned it.   6 
Isaac and Walker (1988) and Sally’s (1995) review of that paper and thirty-six other 
experiments found that non-binding face-to-face communication frequently led to 
contributions of entire endowments.  Brosig, et al. (forthcoming) found that both face-to-
face communication and audio-visual conferences among subjects seated in separated 
locations substantially increased contributions.  They concluded that tone of voice, facial 
expression, and body language play a large part in accounting for communication’s 
effects.  This conclusion differs from our finding that verbal communication without 
visual cues can be as effective as face-to-face communication with visual cues, but our 
experimental set up differs somewhat from theirs, as discussed in Section 3.  
Fehr and Gächter (2000a) found that introducing a costly opportunity to punish 
tended to increase average contribution levels monotonically, even when subjects were 
re-matched in each period with other groups of subjects, and even in the last period.  
Similar experiments, including Carpenter (2000), Sefton, Shupp and Walker (2002), and 
Page, Putterman and Unel (2002), found that while contributions don’t always increase 
with repetition, the trend of decay was substantially mitigated. 
  Fehr and Gächter (2000a) interpreted the effectiveness of the punishment option 
on the grounds that it permitted subjects with a preference towards cooperation to punish 
free riders without reducing their own contributions, thus giving a clearer signal of their 
intentions than would the withdrawal of contributions, which is the only available 
punishment in the baseline VCM without communication or directly targeted 
punishment.  In discussing their experiment, Fehr and Gächter (2000a) suggested that the 
punishment option raises contribution levels because it permits subjects inclined towards 
cooperation to punish free riders without reducing their own contributions, thus giving a 
clearer signal of their intentions than would the withdrawal of contributions, which is the 
only available punishment in the standard VCM. 
  Fehr and Gächter (2000a, 2000b) suggested that experimental subjects may 
include a certain fraction of “reciprocator” types in addition to the more standard payoff-
maximizing types.  The reciprocator types repay kindness with kindness and unkindness 
with punishment.  A related notion is that of “assurance game preferences,” which, 
following Sen (1967), transform prisoners’ dilemma material payoffs into the subjective   7 
payoffs such that when other agents cooperate, the agent in question is better off also 
cooperating.  See Guttman (2000). 
The effectiveness of communication in our own and other experiments suggests 
that not all subjects have pay-off maximization as their only goal, and that many attach 
positive probabilities to their fellow-subjects having non-payoff-maximizing preferences 
and/or entertaining the possibility of such preferences in others.  High contributions and 
punishments in the final period of play suggest the presence of actual reciprocators 
(Andreoni and Miller, 1993, Falk et al., 2001; Page et al., 2002).  These experimental 
results appear to be consistent with a Bayesian interpretation of VCMs. 
  The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 specifies our experimental design.  
Section 3 presents experimental results and analysis.  Section 4 provides discussion and 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. Experimental Design 
We conducted 22 experimental sessions of eight treatments.  As shown in the left 
column of Figure 1, VCM experiments without reduction opportunities but including 
three different kinds of communication and a no-communication baseline constitute the 
first four treatments; as the right column shows, a second treatment corresponding to each 
of these four but adding reduction opportunities constitute the other four.   In each 
session, sixteen inexperienced subjects, drawn from the general undergraduate population 
at Brown University, played a ten round repeated VCM game in groups of four.
4  Except 
in the face-to-face (FF) treatment, subjects interacted only via computer terminals, and 
they could not tell which other subjects were in their group.
5   
 
                                                 
4 Exceptions are two sessions with only 12 subjects each—see below.  
5 Subjects sat at desks in a computer lab seating about 22 and were unable to communicate during the 
experiment and thus unaware of who they were grouped with.  They were recruited mainly through the 
distribution of flyers to the campus mailboxes of the university’s entire undergraduate population, with the 
experiments being identified as being conducted by researchers in the Economics Department.  A brief 
post-experiment debriefing questionnaire shows that 16.1% of the subjects were economics concentrators, a 
little more than the approximately 10% of all undergraduates at Brown who were in that concentration at 
the time.  50.4% of subjects had taken one or more economics courses, with the average number of 
economics courses taken being 1.3.  Subjects were broadly drawn from all classes, from freshman to senior.  
52.6% were females.   8 
 
Table 1: Design of the Eight Experimental Treatments 
 
 







       Baseline 
B 
3 Sessions 
4 groups of 4 each Session 
R 
3 Sessions 
4 groups of 4 each Session 
 
       Face to Face 
FF 
2 Sessions 
4 groups of 4 each Session 
FFwR 
2 Sessions 
4 groups of 4 each Session 
 
       Chat Room 
CR 
3 Sessions 
4 groups of 4 each Session 
CRwR 
3 Sessions 
4 groups of 4 each Session 
 
 
       Numerical Cheap Talk 
NCT 
3 Sessions 
4 groups of 4, 2 Sessions 
3 groups of 4, 1 Session 
NCTwR 
3 Sessions 
4 groups of 4, 2 Sessions 
3 groups of 4, 1 Session 
 
 
At the beginning of each decision period, each subject was provided 
(electronically) with ten experimental dollars and was asked to allocate it, in integer 
amounts, between a personal and a group account.  Money placed in the personal account 
accrued to the individual subject and money placed in the group account was divided 
equally among all subjects in the group, with each receiving 0.4 times the total in the 
account. Thus, the earnings of a subject, i, in a given round of treatments without 
reductions, are  
       
  (10 – Ci) +  (0.4)Sall j Cj            (1) 
 
where Ci (C for “contribute”) is what i assigns to the group account, and the summation is 
taken over all members of i’s group.  After each group member makes his or her 
contribution decision, each learns of the decisions of the others and of his or her own 
earnings.
6  At the end of the experiment, the sum of the ten rounds of earnings were 
                                                 
6 In many VCM experiments, only the group total is made known.  We showed individual assignments in 
our baseline treatment to minimize differences from our treatments with reductions, where (as in Fehr and 
Gächter 2000a and the other experiments cited) subjects determine reductions of one another’s earnings 
after learning of their individual assignments.   9 
converted into real dollars at the rate of $0.13 per experimental dollar, and each subject 
was paid a $5 participation fee.  Experiments lasted from one to one-and-three-quarter 
hours, and real earnings including the participation fee averaged around $25.   
 
Reduction treatments 
  In the treatments with reduction option, the assignment or contribution stage of 
each period was followed by a reduction stage.  At the beginning of this stage, subjects 
learned the assignments to the group account of each other subject in their group.  
Individuals’ identities were protected because assignments were displayed to other group 
members under labels “B,” “C” and “D” only, and these labels changed randomly from 
one period to the next.
7  A subject could then reduce the earnings of another subject at a 
25 cent charge per one dollar of earnings reduction.
8  Each subject then learned her 
earnings for the period, which are equal to her earnings from the assignment stage minus 
her charges for reductions minus the amount by which her earnings have been reduced by 
other subjects.  If this yielded a negative number, earnings for the period were set to 
zero.
9  Thus earnings of subject i are, for a period: 
                                                 
7 The same reshuffling of identifying letters from one round to the next is practiced in all eight treatments.  
This was done, following Fehr and Gächter (2000a), so that a subject could “punish” another group 
member for their behavior in the present period, only, thus ruling out vendettas (but not “blind revenge”—
see above).  
8 Reductions could be imposed only in whole numbers of experimental dollars, so costs were in increments 
of 25 experimental cents.  Some reduction number had to be typed in a reduction box for each group 
member, but this could be zero.  There were two budget rules: (a) that one could not spend more on 
penalizing one’s fellow group members in any round than one had earned in the assignment stage of that 
round, and (b) that one could not spend more on penalizing any given group member than would have 
brought that individual’s earnings to zero for that round, ignoring that individual’s own expenditures on 
reductions and the amount by which that person is reduced by other group members.  The first rule imposed 
a budget constraint, while the second rule protected participants from some wastage of  their resources on 
over-penalizing others, but not from all such wastage, since “joint overkill” by the combined actions of 
several group members is still possible.   We did not prevent such “joint overkill” because doing so would 
have allowed subjects to infer the choices that others made in the reduction stage, which might have 
exacerbated what in theory could already be a strong tendency to “free-ride” on punishing. 
9 Our baseline and punishment treatments differ from those in Fehr and Gächter in two respects.  First, their 
subjects participated in both a baseline and a reduction treatment in the same session, with the baseline 
treatment sometimes coming before and sometimes after the treatment with reductions.   By contrast, our 
basic design involves only one of these treatments per group, partly because, with seven rather than only 
two treatments of interest, there are too many possible sequences of treatments to be handled economically.  
Second, they specify the cost of reducing others’ earnings in absolute cost per 10% reduction of the target 
subject’s earnings for a period, with increasing marginal cost of these share reductions.  With our reduction 
cost formula, it is easier to understand the cost of reducing the target group member by a given absolute 
amount, and the average and marginal costs of reductions are identical and constant.  The approach is 
adopted in some later experiments by Fehr and Gächter as well; see Fehr and Gächter (2002).   10 
 
  (10 – Ci) +  (0.4)SjCj - (.25)SjRij - SjRji        (2) 
 
where Rij is the number of dollars by which i reduces j’s income.  There were three 
sessions of the R treatment (i.e., with reductions but without communication), (see Table 
1).  
 
Face-to-face communication treatments 
The communication stage of our FF (face-to-face) treatment resembles that in Isaac 
and Walker (1988) and Ostrom, Walker and Gardner (1992).  Here, anonymity regarding 
group composition is lost, and the only restrictions are that threats and promises of side-
payments are ruled out.  We ran two FF sessions of our VCM experiment without 
reduction option, and two FF sessions of the experiment with that option, dubbed FFwR 
(see Table 1).  These sessions were identical to their no-communication counterparts B 
(baseline) and R (reductions only), described above, except that after the instruction 
period and before the ten decision periods, we informed the subjects which randomly 
formed groups they had been assigned to and invited each to talk to the other three 
members of his or her group for five minutes.  The conversations took place in the four 
corners of the experiment room within earshot of the experimenters (to ensure the ground 
rules of no threats or offers of side payments), and the subjects then returned to their seats 
and proceeded with the ten round experiment without further communication.  Although 
each now knew which of the other subjects in the room had been assigned to his or her 
group, it was not possible for him (her) to track the decisions of specific individuals, 
since subjects did not know in advance what letters would be used for reporting one 
another’s actions, and these letters were randomly assigned each period. 
 
Chat room treatments 
The chat room (CR) treatments offered a compromise between the more limited 
communication possibilities of the numerical cheap talk (NCT) treatment and the more 
open-ended possibilities of FF.  Group members were brought together in an on-line chat 
room before the first, fourth, and seventh of the ten decision periods.  In the chat room, 
they could discuss anything, subject to the no-threat and no-side-payments rules, and also   11 
to the injunctions that they not reveal to one another their identities or use obscene 
language.  To ensure that these restrictions on communication were adhered to, each 
group’s message flow was monitored by a member of the experiment team who was 
seated at one of the room’s terminals and who had to approve each message before it was 
shown to the group (with a subject receiving a standard message from the monitor in the 
event that one of her messages was rejected).
10  A successfully sent message was seen by 
all members of the subject’s own group, but not those in other groups, each of which had 
its own chat room.  In chat room communication, some of the open-ended character of 
face-to-face communication is possible, but anonymity is preserved, and it is more 
difficult to signal emotional states due to the unavailability of vocal intonation, facial 
expression, and body language.  We carried out three sessions of the CR treatment in our 
VCM without reduction option, and three sessions of a CRwR treatment with reduction 
option as well as chat (see Table 1).    
 
Numerical cheap talk treatments 
In the numerical cheap talk (NCT) treatments subjects, who remained anonymous 
to one another, could communicate through the computer possible numerical choices to 
which they were not committed.  We conducted three sessions of our NCT treatment 
without reduction stages, and three sessions with those stages, dubbed NCTwR (see 
again Table 1).
11  In the treatment with numerical cheap talk and no reductions (NCT), 
each period of play had two stages, the first being a communication stage in which  group 
members entered, in a screen of the same design as that used for binding decisions, what 
the instructions called “possible assignments” to the group account, then all were free to  
overtype their entries as they liked until a fixed amount of time ran out.
12   In the second 
stage, first-stage numerical entries disappeared, a new screen heading announced 
“Binding Decision Stage,” and actual contribution decisions were entered.   
                                                 
10 The average lag time introduced by this message clearance process was less than 5 seconds. 
11 In one NCT session and one NCTwR session, low show-up rates made it necessary to reduce the subject 
pool to 12 students, so that only three groups of four could be formed.   
12 The time allowed for communication was longer in early periods and shorter later on, after subjects got 
used to the process.  Most changes were concentrated early in the cheap talk stages, so that the time 
constraint—at first 90 seconds, eventually 40 seconds—never appeared to be a binding one.    12 
In the NCTwR treatment, there were three stages of each period: communication, 
assignment (or contribution) to the group account, and reduction.  As before, the 
communication stage began with each subject typing in a possible assignment to the 
group account, again using essentially the same screen design used for binding 
decisions.
13  When the assignments were revealed, each had to type in a possible 
reduction of each other group member, which could be zero.  For the remainder of the 
communication stage, each subject was free to overtype and revise her assignment or her 
reductions or both until the time fixed for the communication stage expired.   As with the 
NCT treatment, the contribution stage then followed, with subjects entering their binding 
contribution amounts into a clean version of the decision screen.  The last stage, that of 
reductions, was  identical to that in the R treatment, with a “Binding Decision Stage” 
screen heading and clean boxes into which reduction amounts were entered.   An 
illustration of the decision screen appears in the Appendix. 
The number of times in which subjects could engage in communication varied from 
zero in the B and R treatments to one time (before period 1) in the FF and FFwR 
treatments to three times (before periods 1, 4 and 7) in the CR and CRwR treatments to 
ten times (before each period) in the NCT and NCTwR treatments.  The difference in 
frequency of communication between FF and NCT treatments was partly due to the 
greater speed with which numerical messages could be exchanged in NCT versus the 
time it took to assemble the groups for face-to-face meetings in FF.  But we also 
experimented with only one FF meeting due to the high efficiency this led to in other 
experiments, and we kept to this design when we too had very high efficiency results.  
Our expectations for the effectiveness of NCT were less sanguine, and when achieved 
efficiency was even lower than we anticipated, we kept to the ten communication rounds 
design.  We choose three communication periods in the CR treatments both because of 
the lower time expenditure than in FF (since subjects remain at their seats in CR) and 
because we conjectured that CR communication would be less effective than FF in 
raising contributions. 
                                                 
13 The screen for non-binding communication was distinguished, however, by its color (yellow instead of 
blue) and by a screen label (“You are Now in the Communication Stage”).   13 
A version of the full instructions for the experiment with reduction option and 
numerical cheap talk is shown in Appendix A.  The paragraph of instructions specific to 
the FF and FFwR treatments is shown in Appendix B, while instructions specific to the 
CR and CRwR treatments are shown in Appendix C. 
 
3. Results and Analysis 
Figures 1 and 2 summarize the experiment’s results by graphing the trends in 
contributions and earnings by period in our eight treatments.  Results 1 – 3 below confirm 
and strengthen earlier results in the literature.  Results 4 – 6 constitute the main new 
results of the paper. 
   
Figure 1 
 















































































Result 1: Our baseline treatment (treatment B, with neither reduction nor 
communication) replicated standard findings (Davis and Holt, 1993) that contributions 
begin at 50% or more of endowment, and decline with repetition.  Contributions began at 
an average of 62.9% of endowments, and declined to 19.6% of endowments in the last 
period (see Figure 1 and Table 2).  A regression of average contributions on period which 
excludes period 10 (to exclude the large end-game effect apparent in all treatments) 












                                                 
14 We estimate the regression Cit = bo + b1 (period) + eit, where Cit  is subject i’s assignment or contribution 
to the group project in period t, the b’s are coefficients to be estimated, and eit is an error term.  The 
estimate of b1 is -.5257, which has a t-statistic of -8.688.  There are 432 observations, and the R-square of 
the regression is 0.1493, with F(1, 430) = 75.48, significant at the .001 level.   15 
 
Table 2.  Average Contribution to Group Account by Period and Treatment 
 
 
   B  R  FF  FFwR  CR  CRwR  NCT  NCTwR 
Period                 
    
1  6.29  6.96  10  10  9.58  9.42  6.57  6.43 
2  7.02  7.12  10  9.97  9.71  9.15  6.18  6.68 
3  6.79  6.94  10  10  9.12  9.50  6.07  7.39 
4  5.65  6.77  10  9.69  9.58  9.71  4.84  6.18 
5  4.58  7.37  9.69  10  9.29  9.87  5.14  7.29 
6  4.81  7.15  10  9.53  8.77  9.79  4.82  6.61 
7  4.54  6.75  10  10  9.58  9.96  3.98  6.41 
8  3.56  7.12  9.69  9.75  10  10  3.91  6.89 
9  2.33  7.06  9.06  9.87  9.96  9.79  3.39  7.50 
10  1.94  6.10  7.81  8.94  7.69  8.75  1.95  5.84 
                        
Average  4.75  6.93  9.62  9.77  9.33  9.59  4.68  6.72 
 
Result 2: Our VCM experiments with a reduction option but no communication 
(treatment R) are consistent with others in finding (a) higher initial contributions, (b) no 
decline in contributions until the end of the experiment, and (c) the absence of an overall 
earnings gain.  Contributions began at an average of 69.6% of endowments, and the 
average was slightly higher, at 70.9% of endowments, in periods 5 – 9, with a drop to 
61.0% in period 10 (compared to 19.6% in period 10 in treatment B).  A regression of 
average contributions on period for periods 1 through 9 shows no significant trend, so 
that while a small end-game effect appeared in period 10, adding a reduction option 
eliminated the overall downward trend of contributions found in simple VCM 
experiments, as in Fehr and Gächter (2000a).






                                                 
15  Again estimating the regression Cit = bo + b1 (period) + eit for periods 1 – 9, the estimate of b1 is .0069, 
with t-statistic   0.211. There are 432  observations, and the R-square of the regression is 0.0000, with F(1, 1294) 
=  0.04, statistically insignificant at any reasonable level. Unlike Fehr and Gachter, whose set-up differs in 
details mentioned in footnote 9, above, we do not find a tendency for contributions to increase with 
repetition in our own VCM with reduction option treatment.    16 
 
Table 3.  p-values of Mann-Whitney Tests on Group 
Average Contribution and Group Average Earnings by Pair of Treatments 
 
 
  B  R  FF  FFwR  CR  CRwR  NCT  NCTwR 
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Note: numbers above the diagonal are p-values for two-tailed tests comparing average contributions by 
group in the two treatments in question; numbers below the diagonal are p-values for the corresponding 
tests comparing average earnings by group.  Notations below bold entries indicate the ordering of 
significant differences; for example, C(R)>C(B) means contributions in treatment R are significantly 
greater than contributions in treatment B.  E(FF)>E(B) means that earnings are significantly higher in the 
FF treatment than in the B treatment.   17 
 
Table 3 shows the p-values for Mann-Whitney tests comparing average 
contributions and average earnings between each of the 28 pairs of treatments in our 
experiment.
16  For the comparisons of the B and R treatments, these tests show that 
average contributions over the 10 periods taken as a whole were significantly higher in 
the treatment with reductions than in the baseline treatment. 
As in Fehr and Gächter (2000a), there was a willingness to impose costly 
reductions on other subjects’ earnings, with 83% of subjects imposing at least one 
reduction during their ten round session.  Also as in that experiment, reductions were 
aimed mainly at low contributors.
17  An analysis of changes in contributions shows that  
subjects tended to increase their contribution following a reduction, if their contribution 
had been below the group median.  Such a pattern of punishments and of responses to 
punishment therefore helps to explain why there were higher contributions in the R than 
in the B treatment.  As in Fehr and Gächter, contributions were higher even in the first 
period of the R treatment than in the first period of the B treatment, suggesting that 
subjects anticipated that low contributors may be punished, even before they had seen 
evidence of it in the experiment.   Finally, punishment was substantial in the last period. 
Total dollars of reductions were significantly higher in period 10 than their average in 
periods 5 to 9, according to a Mann-Whitney test at the group level.   This shows that 
                                                 
16 All tests take group-level averages as observations, since each group’s behavior is independent of the 
others in its treatment given that there are no information flows across groups, even in the same session.  
For the comparison of the B and the R treatments, for example, we have 12 observations for each treatment 
(for numbers of observations, refer to Table 1). 
17 93.8% have their own earnings reduced at least one time in the experiment.  The association between the 
amount a subject j contributed to the group account and the amount by which that subject’s earnings were 
reduced by others in his or her group is further illuminated by estimating a regression in which total dollars 
by which j’s earnings were reduced in a given period is the dependent variable, and j’s contribution minus 
the average contribution of the other three members of j’s group in the same period is the only independent 
variable, apart from a constant.  With 480 observations on 48 subjects in 10 periods, the coefficient on the 
relative contribution term is –0.351and the t-statistic is –11.2, significant at the .001 level.  Furthermore, 
such reductions can be shown to lead to higher contributions.  There are 184 observations of subjects 
contributing less than their group’s maximum in one or another of periods 1 through 9.  Taking the change 
in such a subject’s contribution the following period as dependent variable and making the number of 
dollars by which that subject’s earnings were reduced an independent variable in an OLS regression that 
also includes a constant, the estimated coefficient on the amount of reductions is 0.374, significant at the 
.001 level.  The adjusted R-squared of the regression is .129.   18 
some punishments were non-strategic (carried out to increase the future contributions of 
others).
18  
Table 4. Average Earning to Group Account by Period and Treatment 
 
 
   B  R  FF  FFwR  CR  CRwR  NCT  NCTwR 
Period 
               
    
1  13.77  12.98  16  16  15.75  14.53  13.94  11.67 
2  14.21  12.58  16  15.98  15.82  14.50  13.71  12.59 
3  14.07  12.05  16  15.96  15.47  15.05  13.81  13.35 
4  13.39  12.39  16  15.50  15.75  15.15  12.90  12.57 
5  12.75  12.55  15.81  16  15.57  15.19  13.08  13.27 
6  12.89  12.93  16  15.33  15.26  15.11  12.89  12.35 
7  12.72  11.99  16  16  15.75  15.66  12.89  11.88 
8  12.14  12.92  15.81  15.69  16  15.33  12.57  12.45 
9  11.40  12.91  15.44  15.92  15.97  15.59  12.03  13.31 
10  11.16  11.89  14.69  15.01  14.61  13.22  11.17  11.40 
                       
Average  12.85  12.52  15.77  15.74  15.59  14.93  12.89  12.48 
 
Discussion:  The introduction of punishment effectively changed incentives to 
contribute to the group account, since high contributors tended to earn more than low 
contributors in the R treatment, while the reverse held for the B treatment.
19  However, 
the costliness of punishing and being punished led to no net gain in average earnings 
from introducing the reduction option in our experiment (see Table 4).  Not only were 
earnings reduced by the costs of punishing free riders, but also 22% of reduction events 
were aimed at subjects who contributed more than their group average in the period in 
question, including 18% aimed at a period’s maximum contributor (perverse 
punishment).  The high contributors who were punished tended to reduce their 
                                                 
18 In each of the twelve groups at least one subject contributed less than $10 to the group account in the last 
period, and in eleven of these groups at least one subject’s earnings were reduced in that period.  Falk et 
al.(2001) conclude that most punishment is non-strategic. 
19 In the B treatment, high contributors earned less, as shown by the fact that the ten subjects with the 
lowest total earnings contributed an average of 5.1 experimental dollars per period, whereas the ten highest 
earning subjects contributed an average of 3.9 per period.  In the R treatment, in contrast, the ten highest 
earners had contributed more—an average of 7.8 experimental dollars—than the ten lowest—an average of 
5.5.    19 
contribution by $0.50 in period t+1 for every $1 by which their earnings were reduced by 
punishment in period t.
20  
We begin discussion of our communication results with treatment FF. 
Result 3: A five-minute pre-play face-to-face communication period dramatically 
raised contributions to the group account in all periods relative to their corresponding 
levels  in the B and R treatments.  As shown by Figure 1 and Table 2, members of the 
eight groups in the FF treatment contributed their entire endowments in periods 1, 2, 3, 4, 
6, and 7; contributed more than 90% of their endowments in periods 5, 8, and 9; and 
nearly 80% of their endowments in period 10.   Average contributions in the FF 
treatment exceed those in both the B and the R treatments in every period and, comparing 
the FF and B treatments, in every group.  As Table 3 shows, Mann-Whitney tests confirm 
that groups in the FF treatment contributed and earned significantly more than groups in 
treatment B, and likewise, than groups in treatment R.
21   
Discussion: The impact of communication on subjects’ decisions is inconsistent 
with predictions for an environment of common knowledge of payoff-maximizing 
behavior, but consistent with a world in which subjects assign some probability that their 
counterparts believe them to have preferences for reciprocity and/or truth-telling.  That 
twenty-five out of thirty-two subjects continued to contribute their full endowments to the 
group account even in period 10 strongly suggests that many subjects actually have such 
preferences.  The minority of subjects who contribute their full endowments in earlier 
periods but zero in period 10 can be understood to have feigned reciprocity for strategic 
reasons.
22   
Evidently, a face-to-face meeting allowed subjects to jointly assess the problem 
facing them and to enter agreements to address that problem in a cooperative manner.  
                                                 
20 In a regression equation in which the change in a subject’s contribution from period t to period t+1 is the 
dependent variable, and the number of dollars of punishment received in period t multiplied by a vector of 
dummy variables for the punished subject’s position as highest, second highest, third highest, or lowest 
contributor in their group in period t, the coefficient on the highest contributor dummy variable interacted 
with punishment received is -0.5, significant at the 1% level.  Research in progress on perverse punishment 
by Page, Putterman, and Xiaotong Wang. 
21 Again, Mann-Whitney test observations are average earnings and average contributions, respectively, 
over the course of the entire experiment at group level.  This yields 8 observations each for the FTF 
treatment, 12 observations for the B treatment.   
22 Some switches to low contributions in period 10 may also be due to beliefs that others would not 
contribute.  An agent with a conditional preference for reciprocity or cooperation is not expected to 
contribute when he believes that others will not contribute.   20 
But is the same effect possible if subjects remain anonymous to one another, are unable 
to convey impressions by way of body language, facial expression and vocal intonation, 
and cannot reduce “social distance” to the same degree as in a face-to-face interaction? 
The next result addresses this question. 
Result 4: Open-ended but anonymous verbal communication in an on-line chat 
room was almost as effective in eliciting contributions to the group account as was face-
to-face communication.  The average contribution in the CR treatment was only 3% less 
than that in the FF treatment, and a Mann-Whitney test finds no significant difference in 
contribution levels across groups in the two treatments (see Table 3).  Like the FF 
treatment, contributions in the CR treatment were significantly higher than those in both 
the B and the R treatments, according to Mann-Whitney tests (Table 3). 
Discussion: Our results showed a chat room to be a surprisingly effective means 
of reaching an agreement and engendering trust and commitment, a result which seems to 
augur well for the conduct of business and other communications on-line.  However, the 
fact that the subject pool consisted entirely of students in a university of moderate size 
(about 5800 undergraduates) and that each was aware of the presence of the other 15 
subjects in the room may also be important to bear in mind (as discussed in Section 4).
23  
A review of the contents of subjects’ messages shows that about a quarter of substantive 
                                                 
23 Recall also that unlike the FF treatment, where groups meet only once, prior to actual decisions, the CR 
treatment features three on-line meetings per session, before periods 1, 4 and 7.  We noted previously that 
this design was adopted in anticipation of the possibility that CR communication might otherwise be less 
effective than that carried on face-to-face.  Due to this treatment difference, we can’t infer from our results 
that CR and FF communication would be equally effective were both to occur only once.  However, the 
opposite conclusion, that CR communication would have been significantly less effective than FF had both 
occurred with equal frequency, also cannot be derived with certainty.  A noteworthy feature of CR subject 
behaviors is that average contributions decline in the periods before the second and third chat interludes, 
then rise again in what might be partly “recontracting” effect, partly a restart effect of the kind seen in 
VCM experiments without communication (see above).  It seems likely that at least some part of these 
declines is attributable to subjects taking advantage of the pending communication periods by inflicting 
short-term damage on their groups’ cooperative equilibria that they would not have risked were no 
communication opportunity at hand.  That is, subjects looking for opportunities to free-ride with low risk of 
long-term damage might have reasoned that the pending communication opportunity could be used to shore 
up faltering cooperation, thus undoing the damage of their pre-meditated ‘hit-and-run’ behavior.  For 
example, one subject switched from contributing 10 to contributing 0 in the period before chat 
communication, then begged his team-mates to believe that this change had been an unintended typing 
error—a tempting strategy in our design, indeed!  Remember also that subject identification letters were 
scrambled between before each chat period, so that a ‘hit-and-run’ defector could choose to hide behind the 
veil of anonymity.  In many of these cases, cooperation was indeed restored, the violators evidently being 
forgiven or at least their misdeeds being put behind group members for the sake of prospective mutual 
gains. 
23  
   21 
messages are concerned with discussion of what the best strategy would be (e.g.: “If we 
all keep putting in $10, we’ll all earn $25.”), with most of the remaining messages being 
statements of commitment to the common strategy (e.g.: “I’m with you, A.”), and morale 
and team-building remarks (e.g.: “That was a breeze, let’s stick with this!”).
24 
The next question to be addressed is whether the “sword” (i.e. threat) of 
reductions enhanced cooperation in the FFwR and CRwR treatments, as it did in the 
communication experiments of Ostrom et al.   
Result 5: The addition of a punishment option to face-to-face meetings or chat 
room communication did not significantly alter the high level of cooperation seen in the 
FF and CR treatments.  Overall, there are no statistically significant differences in either 
contributions or earnings among the FF, FFwR, CR, and CRwR treatments (see Table 
3).  While contributions and earnings did not differ significantly among these verbal 
communication treatments, those in each of the four treatments were significantly higher 
than those in the B treatment and in the R treatment, according to the Mann-Whitney test 
results in Table 3. 
Although the above four treatments show similarly high contribution levels in 
general, there appears to be a modest difference between the size of the end-game decline 
in contributions in the FF and CR treatments, on the one hand, and in the FFwR and 
CRwR treatments, on the other, which suggests that the prospect of punishment deterred 
some subjects from defecting in the last period.  Beginning in period 8, there is a growing 
difference in average contributions between the FFwR and the FF treatment, reaching an 
average difference of $1.23 in period 10 (see Table 2).
25  Turning to the CRwR and CR 
treatments, Table 2 shows that almost the entire difference in average contributions was 
due to the smaller declines in contributions in the pre-chat periods, 3 and 6, and in the last 
period, 10.  It seems likely that this is attributable to the deterrent effect of punishment in 
                                                 
24 “Substantive messages” excludes ones unrelated to the experimental task, by which group members 
killed time and attempted to amuse one another.  About a third of total messages fall into the latter 
category. 
25 The difference is not significant according to a Mann-Whitney test, since there were also some FFwR 
groups that exhibited substantial last period declines.  Note that low contributors were indeed punished in 
that treatment: out of a total of eight reduction events, six were of subjects contributing less than their 
group average in the period in which their earnings were reduced.   22 
the last periods before restarts
26 and the last period of the experiment as a whole.  While 
contributions did show a period 10 decline in the CRwR treatment, suggesting that some 
subjects doubted they would be punished, those who contributed in period 10 out of fear 
of punishment did so with good reason: in 80% of groups in which at least one subject 
contributed less than $10 in period 10, at least one subject punished one or more low 
contributors, paralleling the finding for period 10 in Result 2.   
  Discussion: Perhaps surprisingly, the record of CRwR messages shows few 
subjects explicitly proposed using reductions as a method of enforcement.  Members of 
some groups even seemed to see the reduction option as a trap set by the experimenters to 
help keep down their earnings.
27  Nonetheless, the fact that reductions were indeed used 
as punishments, and the higher contributions that resulted from this, suggest that many if 
not all subjects recognized that reneging on their group’s agreement might invite 
retaliation. 
  Given the effectiveness of anonymous communication in chat rooms, it might 
seem that numerical messages might be effective as well.  Our final result concerns the 
two numerical cheap talk treatments. 
Result 6: Unlike the treatments with open-ended communication in face-to-face 
meetings or chat rooms, the addition of numerical cheap talk (NCT) did not result in 
additional cooperation.  As inspection of Figures 1 and 2 suggests, the overall trend and 
level of contributions and earnings in the NCT treatment was not significantly different 
from that in the parallel B treatment, and the same relationship holds between the 
NCTwR and its counterpart, the R treatment.  The NCT treatment shows the same 
declining trend in contributions and earnings as does the B treatment, while the NCTwR 
treatment shows the same stability of contributions and earnings through period 9 as does 
the R treatment.
28  Mann-Whitney tests, summarized in Table 3, do not find significant 
                                                 
26 Periods 4 and 7 are “restarts” in the sense that the flow of the game was interrupted just before these 
periods with chat room communications. 
27 Distaste or suspicion of punishment appears also in the experiment discussed by Ertan, Page and 
Putterman (in progress) in which subjects were asked to vote on whether or not to allow it.  Initially, 50% 
of groups voted against allowing any punishment. But eventually, 85% of groups chose to allow punishing 
low but not high contributors after seeing the successes of groups choosing that approach. 
28 Again estimating the regression Cit = bo + b1 (period) + eit, the estimate of b1 for subjects in treatment 
NCT is -.3958, with t statistic -5.095.  There are 396 observations, R-squared is 0.0618, and F(1, 394) = 
25.95, significant at the .001 level.  For the R-NCT treatment, the estimate of b1 is .0625, with t statistic   23 
differences between average contributions and earnings in NCT from those in B, or 
average contributions and earnings in NCTwR from those in R.
29  Like the R treatment, 
overall contributions in the NCTwR treatment were higher than those in the NCT and B 
treatments, because contributions were more sustained over time.  However, also like the 
R treatment and unlike the FF, FFwR, CR, and CRwR treatments, earnings were lower 
in the NCTwR treatment than in the NCT and B treatments, although the difference is 
not statistically significant.  
Discussion: Failure of the NCT treatments to affect contributions, overall, may be 
due both to difficulties in reaching agreements and creating a sense of trust and 
commitment without verbal communication, and to the low subjective cost of lying given 
the “possible choice” description of numerical entries in the experiment’s instructions.  
The similarity of the average net outcomes of the NCT and NCTwR treatments to their 
counterpart treatments without communication, B and R, is consistent with the 
expectations of standard economic theory that communication is simply “cheap talk” 
when there is common knowledge that subjects are payoff maximizers.  But a closer 
inspection of NCT messages and behaviors shows that most subjects attempted to 
achieve coordination on high-contribution equilibria, using the threat of punishment to 
enforce this in the NCTwR treatment.  Consistent with this, some groups achieved high 
levels of cooperation in the NCT and R/NCT treatments than in their counterparts, the B 
and R treatment.  What accounts for the absence of an overall effect is the fact that in 
other groups, subjects attempted to use misleading NCT messages to generate 
opportunities to free ride.  The latter NCT and NCTwR groups achieved even poorer 
outcomes than did low-end performers in the B and R treatments.
30   
                                                                                                                                                 
1.447.  In this case, there are also 396 observations, the R-squared of the equation is 0.0018, and F(1, 1186) 
= 2.09, which is not significant at any conventional level. 
29 The comparisons of NCT to B involve observations for 11 NCT groups and 12 baseline groups.  The 
comparisons of NCTwR to R involve observations for 11 R-NCT groups and 12 R groups.  
30 We explore the richness of NCT interactions in a companion paper (Bochet, Page and Putterman, 2002).  
The findings include: (a) in the numerical announcements, announced reductions are significantly 
positively related to the difference between the targeted subject’s announced contribution and their group’s 
average announced contribution; (b) subjects who announced low contributions adjusted their announced 
contributions upwards when threatened with reductions, whereas subjects who announced high  
contributions adjusted their announced contributions downwards when threatened with reductions; (c) 
subjects who actually contributed less in a binding decision stage than their last announced contribution in 
the communication stage of the same period were significantly more likely to be punished by other group 
members in the binding reduction stage; (d) the more lying or misrepresentation of intentions occurred in a   24 
 
4. Discussion and Conclusions 
  Our public goods experiments with three forms of communication and a no-
communication baseline reconfirmed the strong effect of face-to-face communication on 
cooperation, resulted in surprisingly comparable effects for sharing of typed messages in 
on-line chat rooms, and found that merely exchanging possible numerical decisions did 
not on balance foster cooperation.  We reconfirmed that offering subjects the opportunity 
to reduce one another’s earnings after learning of their contributions elicits many costly 
punishments, primarily of low contributors, thereby delaying the onset of the decay that 
is typical with repetition.  But, partly because up to 20% of punishments were 
“perversely” aimed at high contributors, reduction opportunities did not raise 
contributions by as much as did FF and CR communication, nor did they significantly 
increase earnings either alone or in combination with FF, CR, or NCT communication.  
What implications do these findings have for understanding how and why some forms of 
communication succeed in fostering cooperation, and how the propensity to punish free 
riding might be harnessed more efficiently?   
  The fact that many of our experimental subjects in treatments with face-to-face or 
chat room communication contributed their full endowments in the last period, even in 
the absence of punishment opportunities, suggests that utility and monetary pay-offs do 
not coincide for many individuals.  Last period contribution without threat of punishment 
suggests altruism, reciprocity, or an expectation of disutility from reneging on an 
agreement.   Disutility from reneging on an agreement may help to explain why CR and 
FF but not NCT succeeded in fostering cooperation. 
  The content of the CR messages suggests that professions of commitment were 
also important to our results.  Suppose that some subjects get disutility from reneging on 
an explicit promise regarding an action of mutual interest, so that they will not break that 
promise unless the payoff is high.  Suppose, further, that many subjects believe that other 
subjects have such preferences, and that they also believe it to be possible to assess the 
likelihood that specific others have such preferences by means of verbal and other cues 
                                                                                                                                                 
group during the early periods of play, the lower were contributions in later periods; and (e) average 
contributions varied more from group to group in treatments with NCT than in the corresponding treatment 
(B or R) without it.   25 
(Frank, 1988; Brosig, 2002).  Then communication may foster cooperation by allowing 
subjects to issue explicit professions of commitment and to convince one another that 
they will not renege on their commitments given the stakes involved.   Sally (1995) found 
communication to have a statistically and economically stronger effect on cooperation 
than any other treatment variable.  Moreover, the effect of communication was 
significantly enhanced by experimenter suggestions that subjects could make promises to 
one another, so much so that Sally inferred that “messages have no significance beyond 
their ability to convey promises.”  The failure of our NCT treatments and the success of 
our CR treatments seem to support Sally’s conclusion that “the specific medium of 
language may be an essential factor in influencing behavior.”  
  The high levels of cooperation in our CR treatments may seem to be at odds with 
some recent results in the literature.  Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1998) compared an e-
mail communication treatment to FF and no-communication treatments in a VCM 
experiment.  Both  Frohlich and Oppenheimer’s results and our own found less 
cooperation with electronic than with face-to-face communication, but much more 
cooperation with electronic communication than with no communication.   However, the 
difference between FF and electronic communication results was statistically significant 
in their experiment but not in our own.  Possible explanations include the fact that 
Frohlich and Oppenheimer’s subjects communicated by e-mail rather than in a chat room, 
which deprived the subjects of a running record of their communications.  Subjects had to 
open each e-mail message and may have received more than one message at a time in 
their five person groups, so the use of e-mail could have caused different group members 
to perceive the flow of group communications differently from one another.
31  
                                                 
31 Rocco (1998) compared e-mail with face-to-face communication in a set of social dilemma experiments 
more akin in payoff structure to those of Ostrom et al.  The significantly less successful cooperation 
achieved by e-mail groups in her experiment, as in Frolich and Oppenheimer’s, may partly be due to the 
greater difficulty of her task, since it required identifying an interior equilibrium where investments in the 
group project are neither too low nor too high.  In a comment comparing e-mail to FF but perhaps 
unintendedly shedding light on the inferiority of e-mail to a chat room, she noted that “In contrast to face-
to-face communication in which speakers govern the sequence of the discussion, in the mailing list 
sequence depends on the recipient of the messages who decides what to read first.  The lack of need to take 
turns permits several threads to be discussed at the same time, causing the focus of the discussion to be 
lost.”  These problems may be less severe in a chat room, since all subjects automatically see the same 
messages appearing in the same order.   26 
Brosig, Ockenfels and Weimann (forthcoming) compared a no communication 
baseline to several communication and other treatments.  These included an FF 
treatment, an audio-visual conference, and a treatment with communication by an audio 
channel only.  Their baseline, FF, and audio-visual treatments performed very much like 
our B, FF, and CR treatments, respectively.  However, their audio-only treatment led to 
only slightly more cooperation than did their baseline.  These results led them to 
conclude that “it does not make a difference if people talk face-to-face sitting at the same 
table or watching each other on a video screen. ... What is crucial ... is that there is face-
to-face communication; in particular, audio communication (without face-to-face 
interaction) ... perform[s] significantly worse.”  They go on to speculate “that the 
particular success of face-to-face interaction has something to do with human evolution 
and socialization.  During the evolution of human beings, face-to-face was the only 
available form of communication.” 
Our chat room finding seems inconsistent with Brosig et al.’s conclusions about 
face-to-face communication, but some caution is in order.  Whereas Brosig et al. went to 
great lengths to isolate their subjects from one another in all treatments but FF, our 
subjects sat in the same room in every treatment, including CR.  Although they could not 
tell who their partners were and they were not permitted to speak, signal or gesture 
physically to other subjects, they were visually aware of others’ presence in the room.  
This awareness of proximity may have supplemented the written communications with 
evidence that “the others are real people like myself.”
32 
Like contributions in the communication treatments, last period punishment in the 
reduction treatments suggests utility differing from material payoffs.   Even though many 
of our subjects showed a strong propensity to punish free-riding, however, both 
contributions and earnings were considerably higher in the four treatments (FF, FFwR, 
CR, and CRwR) with open ended communication than in those with punishment but 
without such communication.  Adding a punishment option to a verbal communication 
treatment (FF or CR) did not raise contributions significantly, and although it appears to 
have deterred some free riding in the last period, most subjects shied away from explicit 
                                                 
32 Sally (1995) finds that physical isolation of subjects from one another significantly reduces contributions 
in VCM experiments.   27 
threats in their communications, preferring to cultivate a harmonious atmosphere of 
cooperation by agreement and not threat.  The effectiveness of such agreements is 
probably the most impressive result to emerge from our analysis.
33   
Theoretical discussions of the punishment problem, such as that by Henrich 
(forthcoming), have focused on the fact that while it benefits a group to have some 
“altruistic” punishers of free riding, the individual can earn a higher payoff by letting 
others provide the costly punishments.  In our experiments, however, “second order free 
riding” may be less of a problem than is perverse punishment, the punishment of high 
contributors sometimes to avenge past punishment, sometimes to improve one’s relative 
income, sometimes out of resentment or confusion.  The informational structure of  
our own and similar experiments placed severe limits on subjects’ information about 
what others were doing in the punishment stage.  This may have made it difficult or 
impossible for norms of punishment to emerge or for “rogue” punishers to be disciplined 
by members of their groups.  Communication may have failed to improve the 
performance of punishment in our experiments because subjects lacked sufficient 
information for monitoring and punishing perverse punishment, and therefore failed to 
harness the potential benefits of inclinations to punish free riding.   
  In sum, communication of commitments permitted high efficiency levels to be 
achieved in our two verbal communication treatments.  Observed reciprocity seemed to 
beget an atmosphere of cooperation that many did not want to unilaterally defect from. 
Without a vehicle for proclaiming commitments, numerical cheap talk lacked this effect.  
In treatments with reduction opportunities but without verbal communication, 
cooperation instilled by fear of punishment was lower on average, and more costly.  
Reductions were not limited to punishments of low contributors, but spilled over into 
retaliation and spite.  In our experiments, perhaps, the non-pecuniary self-punishment of 
                                                 
33 The difference between cooperation achieved by ‘friendly’ agreement and that brought about under the 
pressure of threats is remarkably illustrated by comparing the final period of the FF and CR treatments, 
discussed in this paper, with those of an “expulsion” experiment reported in Cinyabuguma, Page and 
Putterman (in progress).  In the latter, subjects played a fifteen-round VCM game similar to that reported 
here in one large group of sixteen members, and had the power to expel individuals from the group (to a 
smaller group playing a VCM with lower endowments) by majority vote.   In every experiment session, 
there were early expulsions, and subjects accordingly raised their contributions until they approached 100% 
of endowments, a level similar to those in the FF and CR treatments of this paper, in later periods.  
However, in the last period, when there is no further threat of  expulsion, the average contribution 
precipitously fell, to about 30%, in the expulsion treatment sessions.     28 
a guilty conscience  proved more efficient than materially costly punishments imposed by 
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This is an experiment, funded by a research foundation, to study decision making.  
You will be earn money in “experimental dollars” during the experiment.  At the end 
of the experiment you will be paid in cash in real dollars (each experimental dollar is 
worth a real $0.13, or thirteen cents).  The amount you will earn will depend on your 
and others’ decisions.  The maximum possible earning is $50 (real dollars) and the 
minimum possible is $8.  You are likely to earn an amount in between.  Please make 





You will be placed in a group of four.  The people in your group will not change 
during the experiment, but you will not know the identity of who is in your group, 
during the experiment or afterwards.  The other three people in your group will have 
“screen names” of B, C, and D.  Your screen name, on your screen, is A, but your 
screen name will be different on others’ screens. 
 
There will be 10 periods in the experiment.  Although the real identity of each of the 
other people in your group is unknown to you, each screen name will refer to the 
same person during a period.  (But at the end of each period the screen names will be 





Each period is like the others, so we will describe how your earnings for the first 
period are determined. 
 
At the beginning of the period each person in your group will receive $10 
(experimental dollars).  You must decide how to divide this amount between a group 
account and a personal account. 
 
The money you assign to your personal account goes into your earnings. 
 
An amount equal to 0.4 times the group’s total assignment to the group account goes 
into your earnings. 
 
Earnings = (amount in personal account) + (0.4)(total in group account) 
 
[Screen 4]   
                                                 
34 These instructions are for the variant of the experiment with reduction option and numerical cheap talk. 
Instructions for variants without one or both of these elements are missing the screens that pertain to them.   33 
 
The next four screens are set up to help you test your understanding of the 
experiment.  For each of the screens that follows, there is a paper worksheet on your 
desk.  Fill in the blanks in the worksheet first, then enter the information in the 
practice decision screen.  The numbers you type in the practice screens are for 






Fill out the stage I section below for the following situation.  The four members of 
your group each have $10.  Every member of your group has assigned $10 to the 
group account and $0 to their personal account. 
 
1. Amount you assigned to group account:        $   
2. Amount you assigned to your personal account:      $   
  (= $10 – group account assignment on line 1) 
3. Total number of dollars assigned to your group account:    $   
4. Income from the group account for a member of you group: $   
  (0.4 • group account total in line 3) 
5. Your earnings after stage I:            $   
  (group account income in line 4 + personal account income in line 2) 
 
Now, go back to the practice screen. Type in your contribution in the window and 





Fill out the stage I section below for the following situation.  The four members of 
your group each have $10.  Every member of your group has assigned $0 to the 
group account and $10 to their personal account. 
 
1. Amount you assigned to group account:        $   
2. Amount you assigned to your personal account:      $   
  (= $10 – group account assignment on line 1) 
3. Total number of dollars assigned to your group account:    $   
4. Income from the group account for a member of you group: $   
  (0.4 • group account total in line 3) 
5. Your earnings after stage I:            $   
  (group account income in line 4 + personal account income in line 2) 
 
Now, go back to the practice screen. Type in your contribution in the window and 
submit it to make sure your calculations are correct.  




Person 2 assigned $10 to the group account and $0 to his personal account, person 3 
assigned $5 to the group account and $5 to his personal account and person 4 
assigned $0 to the group account and $10 to his personal account. 
 
Fill out the stage I section bellow for the above situation where you assigned $5 to 
the group account. 
 
1. Amount you assigned to group account:        $   
2. Amount you assigned to your personal account:      $   
  (= $10 – group account assignment on line 1) 
3. Total number of dollars assigned to your group account:    $   
4. Income from the group account for a member of you group: $   
  (0.4 • group account total in line 3) 
5. Your earnings after stage I:            $   
  (group account income in line 4 + personal account income in line 2) 
 
Now, go back to the practice screen. Type in your contribution in the window and 





Person 2 assigned $10 to the group account and $0 to his personal account, person 3 
assigned $5 to the group account and $5 to his personal account and person 4 
assigned $0 to the group account and $10 to his personal account. 
 
Fill out the stage I section bellow for the above situation where you assigned $6 to 
the group account. 
 
1. Amount you assigned to group account:        $   
2. Amount you assigned to your personal account:      $   
  (= $10 – group account assignment on line 1) 
3. Total number of dollars assigned to your group account:    $   
4. Income from the group account for a member of you group: $   
  (0.4 • group account total in line 3) 
5. Your earnings after stage I:            $   
  (group account income in line 4 + personal account income in line 2) 
 
How does this change affect the earnings of other members of your group, assuming 
that the switch of $1 from your individual to your group account is the only change? 
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Now, go back to the practice screen. Type in your contribution in the window and 








There is another decision that affects your earnings.  Once you learn the others’ 
assignments to the group account, you have a chance to reduce others’ earnings, and 
others have a chance to reduce your earnings.  Suppose, in the last example, you 
decide to reduce B’s earnings by $3, C’s earnings by $5, and D’s earnings by $0.  
The total amount of reductions you make on others’ earnings is $8. 
 
It costs you $0.25 for each $1 you reduce others’ earnings.  So your own earnings are 
reduced by (0.25)($8) = $2 in this example. 
 
Just as you can reduce others’ earnings, others can reduce yours.  Suppose B reduces 
your earnings by $1, C by $3 and D by $5.  The total reduction of your earnings by 
others is ($1 + $3 + $5) = $9.  You will learn that your earnings have been reduced 
by a total of $9 but you will not learn who has reduced your earnings by what 
amount. 
 
Similarly none of the others will learn by how much you have reduced their earnings, 
but only the total reductions. 
 






It costs you $0.25 to reduce the income of another person by $1.00.  Fill out the stage 
II section bellow for the following situation: 
 
You assigned $5 to the group account and $5 to your personal account, person 2 
assigned $10 to the group account and $0 to his personal account, person 3 assigned 
$5 to the group account and $5 to his personal account and person 4 assigned $0 to 
the group account and $10 to his personal account.  You reduce person 2’s earnings 
by $2, person 3’s by $3 and person 4’s by $4.  You receive a total of $1 in reductions 
from other members of your group. 
 
1. Amount you assigned to group account:        $   
2. Amount you assigned to your personal account:      $   
  (= $10 – group account assignment on line 1)   36 
3. Total number of dollars assigned to your group account:    $   
4. Income from the group account for a member of you group: $   
  (0.4 • group account total in line 3) 
5. Your income after stage I:            $   
  (group account income in line 4 + personal account income in line 2) 
6. You reduced the earnings of others in your group by a total of:  $   
7. This cost you:              $   
  (0.25 * the sum of your reductions from line 6) 
8. Other members of your group reduced your earnings by:    $   
9. The total change in your income from stage 2:      -$   
  (line 7 + line 8) 
10. Your total income for these two stages:        $   
 
 
Now, go back to the practice screen. Enter and submit your reductions to make sure 
your calculations are correct. 
 
[Screen 9] 
Your Net Earnings 
 
Your net earnings for a period will be: 
 
  Amount in personal account + 
  (0.4)(Total in group account) – 
  (0.25)(Total of your reductions of others) – 
  Total of reductions of your earnings made by others. 
 
At the end of the experiment, the net earnings for the 10 periods will be totaled and 






At the beginning of each period there will be a communication stage.  You will type 
in a possible amount for your group assignment.  To do this you click on the red 
highlighted box, type in a whole number from 0 to 10, and press ENTER. 
 
When others have typed in their possible amounts to the group assignment, you type 
in your possible reductions of others’ earning.  To do this, click on each of the blue 
highlighted boxes, type in a whole number, and press ENTER.  At any time during 
this stage, you can adjust your possible assignment to the group account and your 
possible reductions, by clicking on a red or blue box, backspacing out the current 
number, typing in a new number, and pressing ENTER. 
   37 
A clock will show you how much time you have for the communication stage.  In the 
earlier periods you will have more time.  In the later periods this stage will be 
shortened. 
 
You are not committed to any of the numbers you type in during this stage. 
 
Once the time ends for this stage, there is a decision commitment stage.  First you 
type in your real and final choice for your assignment to the group account.  When 
everyone in your group has done so, you type in your real and final choices for your 
reductions of others. 
 










Once the decision phase of the experiment begins, you will be asked to remain at your 
seat and to refrain from any form of communication with other participants, except by 
the entry of your decisions on the decision screens.  After the completion of these 
instructions, however, you will be brought together with the other members of your 
group and will have an opportunity to talk with them for five minutes.  During that 
time, you can discuss anything you like with one exception: promises of rewards or 








    Communication 
 
At three points during the experiment, you will have the opportunity to communicate with 
the other members of your group.  During these communication periods, which will take 
place just before round 1, round 4, and round 7, you and other members of your group are 
invited to use your keyboards to type messages to one another.  At the beginning of each 
communication period, you will learn which letter, A, B, C or D, has been assigned to you 
for that period.  When you type a message to your group, your identification letter will 
appear before the message. This letter will remain fixed during the course of a given 
communication period and the immediately following decision stage. 
 
During a communication period, you can indicate in the text of a message that that message 
is intended primarily for a particular group member, for instance by typing “I agree with   38 
you, D.”  However, any message sent to your fellow group members will appear on the 




    Communication Rules 
 
During a communication period, you can discuss anything you like, including what you 
think is the best approach to the experiment, what you plan to do, or what you would like 
others to do. 
 
However, there are two restrictions on the types of messages that you may send. 
  
First, you may not send a message that attempts to identify you to other group members 
other than by your letter A, B, etc.  Thus, you may not use your real name, nicknames, or 
self-descriptions of any kind (“Tom Smith here,” “I’m the guy in the red shirt sitting near 
the window,” “It’s me, Sandy, from French class,” or even “As a woman [Latino, Asian-
American,  etc.], I think…”).  To make sure that the rule of anonymity is adhered to, each 
message will be screened by a monitor who is a member of the experiment team before it is 
seen by the other members of your group.  
 
The second restriction is that there must be no threats or promises pertaining to anything 
that is to occur after the experiment ends.  
 
If a message is found to violate either rule, it will not go to the other members of your 
group, and you will receive a message from the monitor informing you of this fact. 
 




When a communication period ends, it is followed immediately by a decision period in 
which you and the other members of your group enter the amounts you are assigning to the 
group account, in the manner seen in the examples.  These are binding decisions that affect 
your earnings from the experiment. 
 
During the decision period that immediately follows a communication period, you and the 
other members of your group will be identified by the same letters A, B, C and D which 
you were assigned for the communication period.  Those particular letter assignments will 
end, however, at the end of the first decision period following communication.  In the next 
decision period, and in later communication periods, new random letters will be assigned.  





This completes the instructions for the experiment.  You will now have a chance to ask any 
questions you have in order to clarify how the experiment will work.  It is important to note 
that once the question period ends and the experiment begins, there is to be no further 
communication apart from what takes place through your terminals.    39 
 
 